The Recurring problem of the third man by Hales, Steven D.
The Recurring Problem of the Third Man 
STEVEN D. HALES 
Brown University 
Introduction 
The literature on the third man argument is voluminous, and the 
existence of yet another paper on this topic must be well justified.! Pretty 
much everyone agrees that Plato must have relied on three assumptions 
in his regress, which have become known as the One Over Many, Self 
Predication, and Non Identity assumptions. Most writers take Non 
Identity to be a largely uncontroversial matter of stipulation. The main 
virtue of this paper is that it argues that Non Identity is consistent with 
Plato's explicit premises only if Plato accepted a view in the theory of 
reference which I believe he would have denied. If NI is rejected, the third 
man argument is not a legitimate regress and Plato's middle period theory 
of forms has nothing to fear from it. It is also argued that the third man 
argument is a purely an exercise in ontology, and is not concerned 
(primarily) with reference or language. The paper is divided into three 
main sections. The first section is a reading of what happens in the 
Parmenides before the first third man argument at 132a. The second 
section presents two interpretations of the third man. The third section is a 
discussion of reference necessary for evaluation of the two versions of the 
third man argument. 
The Parmenides Before The First Third Man Argument: 
I should say that I am assuming that Plato is an extreme realist 
concerning universals. He considers his forms to be what are now called 
abstract intensional objects; that is, objects like properties, relations, and 
numbers 2 This is not all he believes them to be, of course, but at least part. 
The translation I have worked from is Cornford's. 
1 Some of the especially pertinent literature includes Gregory Vlastos, 
'The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides", The Philosophical Review, 
voLLXUl, no.3 (1954); Wilfrid Sellars, "Vlastos and the Third Man", 
Philosophical Review, voLLXIV, no.3 (1955); P.T. Geach, 'The Third Man 
Again", Philosophical Review, vol.LXV (1956); and Colin Strang, "Plato and 
the Third Man", reprinted in Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, (ed. 
G. Vlastos, Notre Dame, 1971). 
2 R.E. Allen says that this is the generally accepted view, although he 
himself disagrees with it. See his "Participation and Predication in Plato's 
Middle Dialogues", reprinted in Plato I, ibid, p.177. Also compare Vlastos, 
"Postscript to the Third Man: A Reply to Mr. Geach", Philosophical Review, 
vol.LXV (1956), p.90, and Lynne Spellman, "Patterns and Copies: The 
Auslegung, Vol. 17, No. 1 
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126a-127e Introduction 
127e-128e Zeno gives a speech and Socrates questions 
him about it. 
128e-130a Socrates: There are the forms likeness and 
unlikeness, and the many particulars exemplify them. 
Things can be alike in some ways and unalike in others. 
Thus the very same object can exemplify both likeness 
and unlikeness. The same thing is true of unity and 
plurality. I exemplify unity since I'm just one thing, but 
insofar as I have parts, I exemplify plurality too. But this 
doesn't show us anything about the forms themselves. I 
seriously doubt that the form of unity (e.g.) can 
exemplify both unity and plurality in the way I can. At 
any rate, it is a further question.^ 
130b Parmenides: You're a realist concerning abstract 
objects, then, Socrates? 
Soc: Yes. 
Parm: Do you affirm forms for rightness, beauty, 
and goodness? 
Soc: Yes. 
130c Parm: What about forms for man, fire, and water? 
Soc: I'm unsure about these things. 
130d Parm: What about hair, mud, and dirt? 
Soc: No, it seems to me that we don't need to posit 
forms for natural kinds like mud and hair, since the 
particulars are adequate paradigms in these cases. It is 
uncontroversial what mud is, while very contentious what 
Second Version of the Third Man", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64 
(1983),p.l74. 
3 Plato's actual language concerning this possibility is somewhat stronger. 
He claims he would be filled with admiration and astonishment if 
someone could prove that the form of unity exemplifies both unity and 
plurality. I should also note that I am assuming that the relation of 
"partaking" or "participation" that the particulars bear to the forms is what 
is now called "exemplification". Of course, Plato considers relations like 
"being larger than" and "being equal to" to be forms, and relations aren't 
exemplified, but are borne. How the middle period Plato can consider 
relations to be unitary forms is quite a large issue. Geach famously thinks 
that the form of the equals is a pair of absolutely equal things. In any case, 
I think it is best to stick with talk of particulars exemplifying forms, rather 
than muddy up the waters with additional talk of particulars bearing 
relations (which are forms) to other particulars. I don't see that any 
philosophical ice would be cut by doing so. 
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beauty is. Our belief in forms is only fueled by our need 
for epistemic paradigms.4 
130e Parm: You'll be more generous in your ontology 
when you get older and admit forms for natural kinds 
too. 
131a In any case, you agree that there is a relation of 
exemplification X particulars bear to the form of X? For 
example, just things exemplify justice? 
Soc: Certainly. 
Parm: When a form inheres in a particular (where 
inherence is the converse of exemplification), is it the 
whole form which inheres, or a proper part of it? Or shall 
we analyze exemplification and inherence in some other 
way? 
Soc: No, this way. 
Parm: So is it the whole form which inheres or what? 
Soc: Why couldn't the whole form inhere in each 
particular? 
131b Parm: One reason is that the whole form would then 
be in non identical objects at the same time, and one 
thing can't be in two places at once. 
Soc: I think you are wrong here. A form is more like 
a day, which can be in many places at the same time and 
is nonetheless just one thing. 
Farm: I like that analogy. It is like spreading a sail 
over a number of people and saying that one sail as a 
whole was over them all. Is this a fair interpretation? 
Soc: Perhaps it is. 
131c Parm: Is the sail as a whole over each man, or only a 
part over one, and a part over another? 
Soc: Only a part over each. 
Parm: To stick with the analogy, then, only part of a 
form inheres in each of its instances, contrary to what we 
had assumed. 
Soc: I suppose that's right. 
4 My rendition of this speech is well beyond the actual text I think it is a 
better and more consistent response for Socrates than the one he actually 
makes, which is just to admit confusion over why there are no forms for 
mud, etc. Compare Euthyphro 7b-7d where Socrates claims that it is 
relatively easy to, e.g., discover which things are lighter or heavier in 
weight, but that it is very difficult to discover the nature of right, wrong, and 
the good. Also see Phaedrus 263a, where Socrates says, roughly, that we all 
know what iron or silver is, but we dispute about what justice or goodness 
is. Likewise, cf. Republic VII 523d. 
70 AUSLEGUNG 
Parm: Are you prepared to admit that the forms can 
be divided into parts? Then forms will exemplify both 
unity and plurality, just as you claimed you do, Socrates. 
This view yields an answer to your previous question 
[129c]: the form of unity will exemplify both unity and 
plurality. 
Soc: You're right, it would no longer be just one 
thing. 
Parm: Consider this. A proper part of X is smaller 
than X, by definition. Every large particular is large 
131d by possessing a proper part of the form of 
largeness, by assumption. Thus every large particular is 
large by possessing something smaller than the form of 
largeness itself. 
Soc: That seems reasonable. 
Parm: Take an instance of equality. Since that thing 
ha9 just a small part of the form of equality, will it be 
equal to something else? 
Soc: No, that's impossible. 
Parm: Ok, I have a better example. Consider the 
form of smallness. The proper parts of smallness will be 
131e smaller than smallness itself. Thus the instances of 
smallness will all have something smaller than smallness 
itself. 
Soc: That's impossible. We seem to have 
constructed a reductio against the "exemplification as 
having a proper part of a form" view. 
Parm: So if neither the whole form, nor a proper part 
of it inheres in its instances, how are we to understand 
inherence and exemplification? 
Soc: I am at a loss as to how to analyze these 
concepts. 
Parm: Again, there is another question. 
The structure is this. First Socrates questions Zeno about his 
speech, and makes some claims about the forms. Then Parmenides 
questions Socrates about what Socrates's position on the forms is. The real 
discussion starts at 131a. At 131a, Parmenides proposes that to exemplify a 
form, a thing must possess it in some sort of (still unexplained) physical 
way. Socrates agrees that this is a good way of viewing exemplification. 
Two ways of possessing are laid out: possessing the whole form, and 
possessing a proper part of the form. They decide the former way fails on 
the basis of Socrates's analogy with the sail. Then from 131d-131e 
Parmenides gives the following argument against the latter way, and 
Socrates assents that the argument is sound. 
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1) Suppose that small individual objects exemplify the form of 
smallness by possessing a proper part of the form of smallness. 
2) For all things X and Y, if Y is a proper part of X, then Y is smaller 
than X. 
3) Nothing is smaller than the form of smallness. 
4) Thus the form of smallness cannot have proper parts. 
5) Thus no individual object can possess a proper part of 
smallness. 
6) Thus exemplification is a different relation than the "possessing 
a proper part o f relation. 
Premise (1) is the primary assumption to be falsified by reductio, 
and (2) follows analytically from the definition of a proper part. Part of the 
importance of this argument is that in premise (3) we see the first 
appearance of a Self Predication thesis: the form of smallness is itself 
small. Moreover, (3) claims that the form of smallness is (necessarily) the 
smallest thing there is. The conclusions in (4), (5), and (6) follow validly 
from the premises. (3) is, of course, the questionable premise. How can an 
abstract object like a form have a physical property like being small? I 
think that Plato confuses properties (the abstract intension of a predicate) 
and tropes (a particular exemplification of a property) in his analysis of 
exemplification, but I will not pursue this hunch here. R.E. Allen has 
claimed that legitimate universals do not instantiate themselves, and that 
it is absurd to think otherwise 5 This is not right. At least some properties 
do exemplify themselves. For example, being a property is a property, 
being an abstract object is an abstract object, being eternal is eternal, 
being capable of being thought of is capable of being thought of, and so 
on. 
There is another argument against the exemplification- as-
having-a-proper-part-of-a-fbrm view, and one catches a whiff of it at 131c. 
At 129d, Socrates claims that he exemplifies both unity (since he is one 
thing) and plurality (since he has many parts). By analogy, if the forms 
have proper parts, they will likewise exemplify unity and plurality. Around 
129c, Socrates claims that he seriously doubts that the form of unity can 
exemplify both unity and plurality. If it could, then the forms would be no 
better than the particulars as epistemic paradigms. Both forms and 
particulars would have various opposing qualities mixed in. Forms are 
posited as paradigms to start with because they are supposed to be pure 
and unconfusing. See for example Republic V 479a-480a, and the 
discussion of equal sticks and stones starting at Phaedo 74b. If Plato were 
forced to admit that the forms have proper parts, it would be as damaging 
to his paradigmatic theory of knowledge as the third man argument itself 
is usually taken to be. More so, perhaps, since the problem is more 
obvious. 
5 Allen, op cit, p.167. 
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At Republic V 476a, there is some suggestion that Plato thinks 
that to exemplify a form is to have some proper part of the form. However, 
I think that he decisively rejects this view not only in the Parmenides, but 
also in the Sophist at 245a-b, and in the Phaedo at 78c-e. 
I have argued thus far that the discussion of Parmenides and 
Socrates up to the first third man argument is a purely ontological one, 
about how forms relate to their instances. Socrates and Parmenides have 
concluded that (i) particulars do not physically possess whole forms of 
which they are instances, (ii) forms do not have proper parts, and (iii) they 
have not yet correctly analyzed exemplification. 
The Third Man Argument 
At the end of 131e, Parmenides seems to set aside analyzing 
exemplification and move to another point. "Again there is another 
question...", he says, "how do you feel about this?" Here is Cornford's 
translation of Parmenides's first speech at 132a. 
I imagine your ground for believing in a single form 
in each case is this. When it seems to you that a number 
of things are large, there seems, I suppose, to be a 
certain single character which is the same when you look 
at them all; hence you think that largeness is a single 
thing. 
This speech is supposed to contain the famous One Over Many 
Thesis. Socrates nods assent to OM. Parmenides goes on: 
But now take largeness itself and the other [large] 
things which are large. Suppose you look at all these in 
the same way in your mind's eye, will not yet another 
unity make its appearance-a largeness by virtue of 
which they all appear large? 
This passage is supposed to contain a Self Predication 
assumption. Socrates continues to walk down the garden path and agrees 
to SP. Parmenides moves in for the kill. 
If so, a second form of largeness will present itself, 
over and above largeness itself and the things that share 
in it, and again, covering all these, yet another, which will 
make all of them large. So each of your forms will no 
longer be one, but an indefinite number. 
The well known Non Identity thesis, i.e. the claim that the forms 
spun out by the third man argument are all distinct from each other, is a 
premise suppressed in Plato's argument and not explicit in the text. 
I think there are three ways of viewing the third man argument: 
i) as a purely ontological argument. 
ii) as a purely linguistic argument. 
iii) as a mixed argument about reference. 
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If the third man argument is purely ontological, then we might 
formulate the One Over Many Thesis thus. 
OMi: If there are G things, then we can make a set of them, and 
there is a form which the members of the set all exemplify. 
If the third man argument is purely linguistic, then One Over 
Many is better rendered as 
OM2: If there are subjects in a language L, which are subjects of 
the predicate F, then there is the predicate F itself. If the predicate F did 
not exist in L, then it is clear that no subject could be called F in L. Thus a 
necessary condition for F to be predicated of any subject in L is the 
existence of F in L. 
If the third man argument is a mixed argument about reference, 
then One Over Many becomes 
OM3: If one can truly predicate G of some things (i.e. G has a 
non-empty extension) then we can make a set of these things, and there is 
a form, which is the intension of the predicate G. 
I think that we can go ahead and rule out the purely linguistic 
interpretation. Whatever else Plato is up to, he is talking about forms, 
which are not linguistic entities. He is not giving syntactical rules of 
grammar, or metalinguistic rules for languages. I list the pure linguistic 
version for the sake of completeness. Thus the third man argument is 
either about entia exemplifying forms (ontological version), or it is about 
predicates in a language mapping into forms (referential version). As a 
preliminary step to adjudicating between these alternatives, 1 think we 
would do well to spell out the third man argument, first in purely 
ontological language, then in referential language. If one brand of 
terminology is inadequate for formulating a plausible argument, then that 
constitutes good grounds for rejecting that terminology. Hopefully it will 
not be the case that both brands are inadequate. 
Ontological Third Man Argument 
OM (1) If there are G things, then we can make a set 
of them, and there is a form which the members 
of the set all exemplify. 
SP (2) This form itself is G. 
premise (3) There are large things, 
by 1,3 (4) We can make a set of these things and call it 
s i . 
by 1,2 (5) There's a form the members of si all exemplify 
called fi-
by 2J5 (6) fi is large. 
by 4,6 (7) f 1 and the members of si are large things, 
by 1,7 (8) Thus we can make a set of these things and 
call it S2 . 
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by 1,7 (9) There's a form, let's call it (2, that all the 
members of S 2 exemplify, 
by 2,9 (10) f 2 is large. 
by 9,10 (11) f 2 and the members of $ 2 are large things. 
(12) Steps 7 and 11 are logically analogous, and 
the procession of the regress should be 
obvious. 
This is the argument as explicitly presented in the Parmenides. I 
believe that the argument is valid, and clearly so. If you have one form, 
then you seemingly have an infinite number. As it stands, however, this 
argument is open to a strong objection, viz., why should we believe that we 
have an infinite number of different forms? Consider by premises (3) and 
(4) we know that there are large things, and that we can make a set of them 
called s i . By (2) we know the form i\ is also a large thing. Either si 
contains all of the large things, or it only contains some of them. If it 
contains all the large things, then it contains r j . Since $ 2 is defined as the 
set containing the form fj plus all the members of si , sets si and S 2 will 
have exactly the same members. Both sets will have fi and all the large 
particulars as their only members. The form that the members of S 2 all 
exemplify will be the same form that the members of si exemplify (since 
si=s2), viz. fi. Sure step (8) of the argument calls the new form f2 , but we 
can see that it is the very same form as f j . In fact, si, S2,...,sn turn out to be 
just be different names for the same set, and t\, f2 ,«.,fn are merely 
different names for the same form. The third man argument has force 
only if the forms are diverse. And they are not diverse. Let us call this 
argument the Collapsing Argument-the iterated forms all collapse to one. 
It is in response to this argument that Plato needs the suppressed 
assumption of Non Identity. Non Identity can be defended on the 
grounds that fj and f 2 are different because they have different instances. 
A necessary condition for two forms to be identical is that they have the 
same instances at the same time, fi has only the members of si as 
instances. (We are tacitly assuming that only individual objects are in s i ~ 
but there is nothing logically suspect in this assumption. We can thereby 
rule fi out of si by fiat. That is, si does not contain all of the large things, 
only the large particulars.) Notably fj does not have itself as an instance. 
f 2 , on the other hand, has not only the members of si as instances, but it 
also has fi as an instance. Hence fi and f 2 must be different forms. To 
generalize, ~(fn=fn+k) where n and k are non-zero integers/* This is the 
6 As M. Richard Diaz has pointed out, (in "What is the Third Man 
Argument?", Southern Journal of Philosophy, volJCVI, no.3 (1978), p.157) for 
the Third Man argument to be successful it must be shown that each new 
form produced by the regress is non identical to every previous form, not 
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hidden premise that Plato needs. But note the commitments of NI. For 
NI to be consistent with the explicit premise of SP, we cannot interpret SP 
as claiming that i\ exemplifies itself. If i\ exemplified itself, then i\ would 
have itself as a instance, and we would lose our grounds for claiming that it 
isn't identical with f2- And thus we would lose our grounds for accepting 
NI. What is being claimed by SP, rather, is that fi is large. In other words, 
a logical wedge must be driven between t\ being large and fi exemplifying 
itself in order for NI to be both true and consistent with SP. 
The third man argument is a legitimate regress and generates an 
infinite number of different forms only if the Collapsing Argument is 
unsuccessful. The Collapsing Argument is unsuccessful only if NI (i.e. 
~(f n=f n+lc) where n and k are non-zero integers) is true. NI is true—and 
consistent with SP-only if fi (the form of largeness) can be large and yet 
not exemplify itself. 
So in order to save Plato's third man argument, we must show how 
it is possible for fj to be large and yet not exemplify itself. Claiming that it 
is possible seems to buy into a kind of logical muddle that a clear thinker 
should avoid. There does seem to be one way of defending the idea that fi 
is large but does not exemplify itself, however. Suppose the predicate 
'being large' has more than one intension. Since forms are the intensions 
of predicates, 'being large' would map to more than one form. There 
would then be several diverse forms which corresponded to the predicate 
'being large-let's call them i\, (2, and {$. The form f\ could be large (by 
exemplifying f"2, say) and yet not exemplify itself. There is no free lunch, 
though. Taking this route requires buying into certain semantic theories 
which may be false, distasteful to Plato, or both. 
Discussion of these semantic commitments will be more 
appropriate after I have constructed the third man argument using 
referential language. Therefore further evaluation of the Ontological 
Third Man argument and the issues surrounding NI will be temporarily 
postponed. In the referential version I will proceed on the assumption that 
the crucial relation in the third man is not that which holds between 
particulars and forms, but that which holds between predicates and forms. 
The relation of choice will no longer be 'x exemplifies y', but 'y is the 
intension of x'. 
Referential Third Man Argument 
OM (1) If one can truly predicate G of some things 
just non identical to the last one on the list. It is worth demonstrating that 
NI as I have formulated it will accomplish this. Pick any form on the 
regress you like, say, fg7. f87 will have fJ86, fJ85/ f84? f83/»vfl/ plus all the large 
particulars as instances. No lower number form will have all the same 
instances as fgj, since no form has itself as an instance. Thus each new 
form is non identical to every previous form. 
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(i.e. G has a non-empty extension) then we can 
make a set of these things, and there is a form, 
which is the intension of the predicate G. 
SP (2) This form itself is G. 
premise (3) There are large things; i.e. the extension of 
the predicate 'being large' is non-empty, 
by 1,3 (4) We can make a set of the things in the extension 
of "being large' and call it si. 
by 1,2 (5) There's a form called fj which is the intension 
of the predicate 'being large', 
by 2,5 (6) fj is large 
by 4,6 (7) f i and the members of si are large things, 
by 1,7 (Q) Thus we can make a set of these things, call it 
S2. 
by 1,7 (9) There's a form called ft which is the intension 
of the predicate "being large', 
by 2,9 (10) f 2 is large. 
by 9,10 (11) f 2 and the members of &2 are large things. 
(12) Steps 7 and 11 are logically analogous, and the 
procession of the regress should be obvious. 
This argument is likewise obviously valid. As it stands it is open to 
the same sort of Collapsing Argument as was leveled against the 
ontological version. Can the Collapsing Argument be staved off by an 
appeal to non-identity? Non- identity was defended in the ontological 
version on the grounds that, given certain assumptions, the iterated forms 
have different instances. Unfortunately, this line of (ontological) defense 
is not available here. We need referential grounds to defend non-identity. 
One way out is to say that "being large' has diverse meanings; i.e. it has 
different intensions. Thus fj and ft are different intensions of the same 
predicate, "being large'. Note that this is precisely the same stratagem 
needed to save NI in the ontological version. This I think is a remarkable 
result. No matter how we interpret the third man argument, the argument 
is a successful attack on the middle period theory of forms only if Plato 
subscribes to a certain view in the theory of reference. Plato must hold 
that it is possible for a predicate to have more than one form as its 
intension for either version of the third man to work. 
Now there are two questions: (1) should Plato have held that a 
predicate can have more than one form as its intension, and (2) did he 
hold it? I will examine the first question first. To do so requires a little 
excursion into the theory of reference. 
A Held Trip Into Reference 
At first it seems obvious that one predicate can have different 
intensions. For example, *being a ball' can concern either a rubber thing 
which bounces, or it can connote a formal dance. Predicates like 'being 
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large* or 'being flat' may even have an infinite number of intensions. The 
problem with "being flat', e.g., is that we preanalytically want to say things 
like 'west Texas is flat', and 'this desktop is flat'. However, if you look 
closely enough, everything has bumps. There isn't anything which is 
absolutely flat. Are our preanalytic claims just false, strictly speaking? And 
consider this: compared with the desktop, west Texas is not flat. So is the 
desktop flat and not west Texas, even loosely speaking? In short, we need 
some account of how to truly apply the predicate *being flat'. Here is a 
sketch of some options: 
i) Nothing is flat since everything has bumps. The extension of 
'being flat' is empty! 
ii) Criteria for inclusion into the extension of 'being flat' are 
context relative. When we're talking about land, west Texas is in the 
extension of "being flat'. When we're talking about desks, west Texas is not 
in the extension of "being flat', since compared to a desktop, west Texas is 
not flat. There is just one predicate "being flat', and its extension varies 
across contexts. 
iii) 'Being flat' becomes a different (albeit homonymic) predicate 
when we switch to another context. For every context n, "being flatn« has 
fixed, definite criteria for forming its extension. When we are talking 
about desktops being flat, we are really using the predicate 'being 
flatdesktop'. When we are talking about west Texas being flat, we are 
really using the predicate 'being flatland'. There is a different homonymic 
predicate 'being flatn' for every context n. 
Option (i) is endorsed by Peter Unger (at least at one time).? The 
advantage of (i) is that the criteria for getting into the extension are fixed 
and specifiable, and thus 'being flat' has only one intension. A 
disadvantage of (i) is that nothing in this world is flat, and so "being flat' 
becomes a pretty useless predicate (at least outside of fiction). We will 
need some other less strict predicate to describe our desktops and land. I 
wonder what kind of possible world actually contains flat things. A world 
with only monads as individual objects? A world with only two spatial 
dimensions? I don't know. 
Option (ii) is taken by David Lewis. 8 The advantage of (ii) is that it 
allows us to talk about flat things in this world, and make sense of the fact 
that west Texas and the desktop are both flat, but not "in the same breath". 
The disadvantage of (ii) is that the criteria for the extension of "being flat' 
change from context to context. A necessary condition for intension 
7 Unger, Peter, Ignorance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp.65-
68. In a more recent work, Unger seems to be taking a mellower position. 
See his Philosophical Relativity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984), pp.22-23. 
8 Lewis, David, "Scorekeeping in a Language Game", Journal of 
Philosophical Logic, 8 (1979), esp. p.353. 
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identity is necessary coextensiveness. When we use 'being flat' in the 
context of land we get one extension, and when we use it in the context of 
desktops we get another. Thus 'being flat' has different extensions, and 
hence it has different intensions. If for every distinct context we get a 
correspondingly distinct extension for "being flat', and there are an infinite 
number of different contexts, then there are an infinite number of 
different intensions for "being flat'. 
I do not know of anyone who explicitly embraces option (iii), but I 
wish to submit it as a live possibility.? The advantage of (iii) is that for any 
'being flat n', there are fixed and definite criteria for membership in its 
extension. Thus any 'being flat n' has only one intension. We might call 
(iii) a hatstand model-one predicate, one intension. As a bonus, (iii) 
comes with all the advantages of (ii), namely, that we can make sense of 
the fact that the desktop is fiat and west Texas is flat, but not by 
comparison with the desktop. West Texas is not flatdesktop' hut it is 
flatiancj. There is no 'being flat simpliciter* according to which the desktop 
is flat and west Texas is not. If there is a *being flat simpliciter', then it is 
the very strict sense of flatness which none of the bumpy material objects 
in this world can satisfy. The disadvantage of (iii) is that we are committed 
to admitting that there are many more predicates in our language than we 
had suspected, and that many of them are (to our confusion) homonymic. 
Further defense of (iii) is beyond the limits of this paper. 
If (iii) is a plausible option, then we need not say that Plato should 
have held that a predicate can have more than one form as its intension. 
But was (iii) available to Plato? Would he have been amenable to it? I 
submit that the answer is yes. Colin Strang thinks the third man argument 
is a reductio against a uniqueness thesis: there is one and only one form of 
(e.g.) largeness.10 Why is Plato committed to the uniqueness thesis? A 
large part of Plato's motivation to believe in the theory of forms is that 
forms are supposed to be epistemic paradigms. We learn how to apply 
predicates via our recollection of the forms they express. An epistemic 
paradigm is supposed to be an explanatory telos; a final, self subsuming 
answer to the question "what is it?".H If there is a red tag sale on forms-
buy one, get some more for free-then it is hard to see how the "what is it" 
question will get a satisfactorily final, self subsuming answer. If there is 
more than one form for 'being large', Plato's paradigmatic theory of 
learning faces grave difficulties. Anders Wedberg has claimed that in 
Republic X Plato explicitly rejects the idea that a predicate can have more 
than one intension. Wedberg writes, "corresponding to each plurality of 
9Felicia (formerly Diana) Ackerman may advocate this view. 
10 Strang, op cit. 
11 By comparison, Sarah Waterlow calls forms "fixed stopping- points of 
being" in "The Third Man's Contribution to Plato's Paradigmatism", Mind, 
vol XCl (1982), p.347. 
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objects to which we apply a common name, there is a unique Idea which 
justifies the application of that name..ior each name "Y", there is a unique 
Idea such that being Y and participating in that Idea are necessarily the 
same".12 
If Wedberg is right about this, and Plato antecedently denies that 
it is possible for a predicate to express more than one form, Plato cannot 
consistently embrace either version of the third man argument. The 
referential version of the third man is an obvious non starter, since NI is 
defenseless. If "being large' can express only one form, then there is no 
way that the argument can generate an infinite number of diverse forms of 
largeness. The "forms" ostensibly iterated by the referential version are 
clearly just different names for the same form. Matters are a little more 
complicated in the ontological version. NI is, of course, required for the 
ontological version to be successful. Recall that it was argued that NI is 
both defensible and consistent with SP only if a logical wedge can be 
driven between fi (the first form expressed by "being large' generated by 
the third man argument) being large and fi exemplifying itself. It was 
then argued that this wedge can be driven only if 'being large* can have 
more than one form as its intension. Since Plato rejects this last condition, 
the ontological version of the third man argument also fails to produce an 
infinite number of different forms. 
If both versions of the third man argument fall to the Collapsing 
Argument, what grounds do we have for thinking that Plato intended one 
version rather than the other? I think there are two reasons for holding that 
Plato intended the ontological version. The first is that, as I have argued, 
given Plato's antecedent rejection of predicates mapping to more than one 
form, the referential version of the third man argument cannot get off the 
ground. I hesitate to saddle Plato with an argument clearly premised on 
something he rejects. The ontological version fails for basically the same 
reasons, but how this is so is considerably more opaque. It is reasonable to 
think that Plato did not see the final commitments required to make the 
ontological third man work. The second reason I find the ontological 
version to be the likelier candidate is that accepting the ontological third 
man as the argument intended by Plato squares well with Socrates's and 
Parmenides's discussion just prior to 132a. I have previously argued that 
their discussion was purely ontological, about how particulars relate to 
forms. While Parmenides at 132a turns away from analyzing 
exemplification, exemplification is still on his mind when he presents the 
third man argument. When Parmenides says "again, there is another 
question" at 131e, he means "again, there is another question about 
exemplificat ion". 
12 Wedberg, Anders, Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics (Stockholm: 
Almqvist and Wiksell, 1955), chapter 3. 
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Conclusion 
Plato may honestly have thought that the third man argument 
was a troubling and powerful objection to his uniqueness thesis and hence 
the middle period theory of forms. It is no slight on Plato to say that he did 
believe the third man to be sound. It is far from obvious why the regress 
fails; a good deal of analysis has been required to show its failings. 
Regardless of what Plato might have believed about the argument, I am 
pleased to tell him that he is free to keep forms as universals (the One 
Over Many Thesis), free to keep forms as paradigmatic instances (the Self 
Predication Thesis), and free to keep these paradigms as unique ends of 
explanation (the Uniqueness Thesis). I conclude that insofar as the first 
third man argument in the Parmenides is concerned, Plato can keep the 
middle period theory of forms intact.13 
13 I am indebted to Martha Nussbaum for criticisms of an earlier version 
of this paper, and to James Dreier, John Greco, and Jaegwon Kim for 
helpful discussions. 
